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Purpose 
This paper analyzes the mediating role of contracts and trust on the generation of 
product innovations stemming from buyer-supplier knowledge-sharing among the 
members of the supply chain. Together with the individual effects of trust and contracts, 
their joint effect is examined in order to determine whether these are complementary or 
alternative mechanisms of safeguarding and control.  
Design/Methodology/Approach 
Drawing on a survey of 202 European machine tool firms acting as buyers and sellers, 
we propose and evaluate a structural equation model. 
Findings 
Results confirm that there is a positive relation between contracts and trust with respect 
to buyer-supplier knowledge-sharing, and of the latter with respect to innovation 
performance. They also show that firms in which both the levels of trust and contract 
use are high reinforce their product-innovation capability based on buyer-supplier 
interaction (complementarity thesis). However, results also show that, contrary to trust, 
contracts by themselves do not act as a stimulus for product innovation.  
Limitations/Implications 
Establishing contracts seems to be a highly recommended action in a buyer-supplier 
relationship focused on increasing innovation capacity. This does not go against 
engendering trust in a relationship. Both trust with a degree of formalization, in 
different ways, help to increase the effect of sharing valuable knowledge on innovation 
capacity.  
Originality/Value 
To our best knowledge, no prior study has delved into differentiating the use of 
contracts and trust as mechanisms in mediating the effect originated from knowledge- 
sharing on product innovation performance with two different samples formed by 
buying and selling firms.  
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MEDIATION EFFECTS OF TRUST AND CONTRACTS ON 
 KNOWLEDGE-SHARING AND PRODUCT INNOVATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A firm’s buyers and suppliers are important sources for the identification of strategic 
challenges and the knowledge required to meet them: in other words, to innovate. 
Relationships with suppliers in particular can have a considerably positive influence on 
buyers’ innovative capacity and their ability to offer high quality and added-value 
products down the supply chain (Dyer & Nobeoka 2000, Bessant 2004, Wagner 2006). 
Collaborative relationships with buyer firms can also be a source of creativity and new 
ideas, as well as an effective way of ensuring loyalty to the seller. In this connection, 
there is a need to establish and maintain long-term relationships (Anderson & Narus 
1990; Bidault & Castello 2009; Gila 2009; Grönroos 1983; Jap & Ganesan 2000; 
Noordevier et al. 1990) and to find mechanisms for effective diffusion of needs and 
knowledge among buyers and suppliers. 
Various studies have brought to light the positive relationship between knowledge- 
sharing and innovation performance for the members of the supply chain (Li et al. 2009; 
Lin et al. 2012; Tsai 2009). This has led to the conclusion that firms sharing more 
knowledge tend to benefit from more valuable innovations. Sharing information can 
also bring risks, however, to the extent that it can lead to a loss of exclusive knowledge 
that is fundamental for the firm. Especially important, therefore, are the means available 
for ensuring that buyer-supplier knowledge-sharing (KS) does help the organization to 
gain a competitive edge without precipitating any opportunistic actions from 
competitors. The existence of formal contracts and the presence of trust are two well-
recognized instruments of guarantee and control to this end (Williamson 1985, Dyer & 
Singh 1998, Wang et al, 2011, Cao and Lumineau, 2015). However, current research in 
the field has not reached a consensus on whether trust or a formal contract is more 
useful for the purpose of engendering innovation in the buyer-supplier realm, or with 
respect to how they should be employed. This is information that managers need in 
order to focus their efforts on the most adequate tool for the improvement of their 
innovation capability. 
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Therefore, the principal aim of this paper is the analysis of the mediating role of 
contracts and trust on the generation of product innovations stemming from buyer-
supplier KS among the members of the supply chain, and thus to give an answer to 
some practical questions for management: Will increasing the formalization of the 
contract have a significant effect on innovation performance? Would an increase in 
mutual trust have a comparable effect? Will those two factors be mutually exclusive 
with respect to the improvement of innovation performance, or reinforcing it? And how 
does the combination of the two mediate the effect of buyer-supplier KS on innovation?  
Data for analysis were gathered from 202 European firms in the machine tool industry, 
which is characterized by buyers and providers being the main drivers of innovation 
(Carlsson 1995; Chuma 2001; Lissoni 2001; Lissoni & Pagani 2003; Chen 2006; Otero 
2010). Those same buyers and suppliers are also a conduit for potential knowledge 
spill-over to competitors (Chen 2006; Chuma 2001; Lissoni & Pagani 2003; Otero 
2010; Wengel & Shapira 2004). This industry is therefore a particularly interesting 
setting for the study of exchange governance mechanisms. 
Our paper is organized as follows. The introduction is followed by a review of the 
literature on trust and contracts, and their impact on buyer-supplier KS and innovation, 
which forms the basis of a four-part hypothesis for empirical testing. The third section 
explains the methodology of our study, and describes the main results. A fourth section 
presents our conclusions and then examines the theoretical and practical implications of 
the study. We finally identify and discuss the limitations of the research and the avenues 
that remain open for further research. 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
2.1. Knowledge-sharing routines and innovation 
Dyer & Singh (1998, p. 665) define knowledge-sharing routines among firms as 
“regular patterns of inter-firm relations that permit the transfer, recombination and 
creation of specialized knowledge”.  
The delivery of complex products and services, when valuable knowledge is 
recognized, shared and absorbed from partners, can generate improvements in the 
selling firm’s  cognitive capacity and information-processing capabilities from a 
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condition of bounded rationality to one of expert rationality (Gulati & Sytch, 2007; 
Uzzi, 1997). Intense information and knowledge-sharing between buyers and suppliers 
increases the probability of generating new ideas early in the process and of discovering 
new ways to enhance performance (Dyer 1997) and thus, be a key factor in product 
innovation performance (Lin 2007; MacDuffie & Helper 1997). 
Sharing and exploiting knowledge are linked to the conditions needed for its transfer, 
requiring efforts and resources such as smooth and easy communication; parties to the 
transfer who request or provide information; access to technical information available 
for transfer from the employees of one firm to those of the other; or technical 
communication resources that are compatible with the other party’s (Charterina and 
Landeta, 2013). The following hypothesis, in line with two previous studies from 
Charterina and Landeta (2010 y 2013), links the efforts to share information and gain 
knowledge with superior performance in product innovation. Thus: 
 
H1. A great knowledge-sharing effort in the buyer-supplier relationship is positively 
related to superior product innovation performance. 
 
2.2. Trust, knowledge-sharing and product innovation performance 
The literature on business-to-business relationships discusses numerous ways in which 
trust enhances buyers’ and suppliers’ performance in exchange relationships. Given the 
goal of our research study, this sub-section will focus on the literature linking trust, 
buyer-supplier KS and product innovation. 
Trust between buyer and supplier can be defined as the expectation that the other party 
can be relied upon to fulfill its obligations, to behave predictably, and to act and 
negotiate fairly even when opportunism is possible (Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone 1998), 
whether or not the behavior of said party can be monitored or controlled (Mayer et al. 
1995; Joshi & Stump 1999; Krishnan, Geysenks & Steenkamp 2016) 
When buyers and suppliers trust each other, they are more willing to engage in open 
communication and share information (Jap 1999; Morgan & Hunt 1994; Villena et al. 
2011; Zaheer et al. 1998). In their meta-analytic review of 75 studies van Wijk et al. 
(2008, 840) found strongly significant medium to large effect sizes of trust on 
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knowledge transfer, concluding that trust and tie strength were the most important 
drivers of organizational knowledge transfer across organizations. Effective learning 
between partners is thereby facilitated (Gulati 1995; Lane et al. 2001; Selnes & Sallis 
2003) and innovation performance enhanced (Wang et al. 2011). 
Trust influences not only how much knowledge is shared between parties, but also the 
type that is transferred. When buyers and suppliers believe they will not be harmed or 
placed at risk by the other party’s actions, they are more likely to share tacit knowledge 
that is specific and valuable (Dyer & Singh 1998; Uzzi 1997) and even organization-
specific, proprietary and sensitive information (Uzzi 1997; Zaheer et al. 1998; Carey et 
al. 2011; Selnes & Sallis 2003). Trust can also help to evaluate and better understand 
knowledge-sharing between buyers and suppliers (Lane et al. 2001), in that “social 
relationship imbues information with veracity and meaning beyond its face value” (Uzzi 
1997, p. 46). 
In long-term relationships, such as those between the buyers and suppliers in our 
research sample, there are high levels of uncertainty and risk in terms of resources 
committed and final outcomes. Trust plays a critical role in the development of such 
long-term relationships, covering expectations about what the other party will do in 
circumstances that are very difficult to specify in a written contract (Blomqvist et al. 
2005). In addition, disagreements might occur at different junctures in long-term 
relationships. High levels of trust enable both parties to find joint problem-solving 
solutions and sort out problems ‘on the run’ (Uzzi 1997), and to have the freedom to 
disagree, find productive resolutions to disagreements and produce novel insights from 
shared ideas (Moorman et al. 1992; Morgan & Hunt 1994).  
Researchers have found a strong positive relationship between inter-organizational trust, 
business performance and innovativeness (Wang et al. 2011, Zaheer et al. 1998), 
suggesting that such trust paves the way towards inter-firm negotiations by lowering 
transaction costs (Zaheer et al. 1998) and increasing innovation (Molina-Morales et al. 
2011). If the environment is extremely uncertain, mutual trust rather than formal 
contracts is the most effective mechanism for managing the supply chain relationship 
(Wang et al. 2011). When the high level of uncertainty is related to partner firms’ 
behavior, trust has been found to have a particularly positive effect on performance 
(Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven (2006).    
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The role of trust as either an antecedent or mediator in buyer-supplier KS has been 
widely discussed in business-to-business literature. However, few previous studies have 
focused on its mediating effect in the direction from knowledge sharing to innovation. 
Trust can develop from knowledge mutually gained in the relationship, exercised by 
means of what Ballantyne (2004) has called “iterative cycles of dialogue”. In the 
supplier-manufacturer relationship, the establishment of embedded ties enables the 
creation of informal coordination mechanisms with the consequent elements of trust, 
commitment or joint problem-solving (Huang and Chang 2008). Pre-existing levels of 
trust between incumbent firms and potential buyers of disruptive technologies affect the 
former’s intention to adopt a new, disruptive technology (Obal 2013). 
In long-term buyer-seller arrangements characterized by a high level of servicing, it is 
plausible to expect a relationship in which trust not only enhances buyer-supplier KS 
but that the relationship, in turn, also acts positively on trust. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that: 
H2a. In a buyer-supplier relationship, greater knowledge-sharing routines are positively 
associated with a higher degree of trust. 
Reflecting on the extensive work published on trust as a variable that is positively 
linked to product-innovation performance, we also propose: 
H2b. In a buyer-supplier relationship, greater trust is associated with a higher degree of 
product innovation performance. 
The linkage of these two sub-hypotheses allows us to account for the mediation effect 
(Baron and Kenny 1986; Cheung 2007; Hayes 2013) of trust in the relationship between 
buyer-supplier KS and product innovation performance. We therefore further 
hypothesize that: 
H2c. Trust positively mediates the effect of buyer-supplier KS routines on product 
innovation performance. 
 
2.3 Contracts, knowledge-sharing and product innovation performance 
Empirical evidence on indication of linkages between contracts, buyer-supplier KS and 
product innovation has not been conclusive. On the one hand, contracts can delineate 
the rights and obligations of buyers and suppliers and thereby reduce the risk of 
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opportunism. Specifically, there is empirical evidence that they: improve partners’ 
coordination and commitment (Jap and Ganesan 2000); enhance the level of 
cooperation (Sivadas and Dwyer 2000); encourage the discussion and articulation of 
unspoken assumptions (Cannon et al. 2000); make exchange of information transparent 
(Noordhoff et al. 2011) and clarify expectations and obligations relating to innovation 
performance (Wang, Yeung and Zhang 2011). These points enhance buyer firms’ 
innovation performance and cost control (Carey et al. 2011); and, as an overall 
consequence, facilitate knowledge transfer and improve product innovation 
performance (Wang et al. 2011).   
According to Noordhoff et al. (2011), contracts between firms typically envisage and 
establish communication activities to be completed at key future points in the 
innovation process, and set them up. This means that valuable information which may 
have been overlooked in a less formalized relationship is included and that it is more 
structured and refined when shared. It should also reduce trivial and repetitive informal 
information flows that feed redundancy. In addition, contracts provide a way to manage 
conflict during knowledge transfer. Thus, the risks associated with spillover from buyer-
supplier KS and collaborative innovation across the supply chain are lower, and the 
corresponding transaction costs reduced (Wang et al. 2011). 
On the other hand, contracts between buyers and suppliers that are too detailed and 
complex can be as harmful to the knowledge transfer process as those containing too 
little information (Wang et al., 2011). The former may provide little flexibility to both 
parties (Jap and Ganesan 2000), hinder information sharing between a manufacturer and 
its suppliers in a limited area because of clear, contractual specification of what is and 
what is not allowed (Wang et al. 2011), and limit informal buyer-supplier KS 
(Noordhoff et al. 2011). Furthermore, as explicit contracts can signal a lack of trust on 
the buyer’s part to the supplier, resulting in wariness from the latter, this is likely to 
bring about lower levels of commitment (Jap and Ganesan 2000) and sharing of tacit 
knowledge (Wang et al. 2011). The use of complex and detailed contracts in a 
manufacturer-supplier relationship may thus hinder knowledge transfer and 
collaborative innovation.  
In fact, a study by Wang et al. (2011) highlighted that a contract with too many 
specifications can be as harmful as one with too little detail, despite a positive link 
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between a well-specified contract and a firm's innovation performance, (forming an 
inverted U-shaped relationship) 
The research discussed in this sub-section has focused on explanation of how formal 
contracts affect buyer-supplier KS. Though the chronology of the factors and effects 
might imply causation, it will not be clear-cut in the case of long-lasting and reiterative 
relationships or those entailing the sale of a complex product demanding continuous 
revision of contract clauses. Given that positive effects are more frequent than negative 
ones according to the literature, and that the latter are more often a consequence of 
inadequate administration of contracts than actually using them, we hypothesize the 
links between contracts and buyer-supplier KS as follow:  
H3a. A more intensive level of knowledge-sharing is linked to a greater use of contracts 
setting out the terms of the relationship between buyers and suppliers. 
H3b. Intensity in the use of contracts is linked to a higher level of product innovation 
performance. 
H3c. Contracts positively mediate the effect of knowledge-sharing routines on product 
innovation performance. 
 
2.4. Do contracts and trust substitute or complement each other? 
The literature has approached the relationship between trust and contracts as one in 
which either factor substitutes the other or the two complement each another. The 
substitution view argues that trust reduces the need for formal contracts (Gulati 1995; 
Ghoshal & Moran 1996; Dyer & Singh 1998; Uzzi 1997; Zaheer et al. 1998; Adler 
2001; Wuyts & Geyskens 2005; Yang et al. 2011; Wang et al. 2011). Proponents of the 
substitution argument assert that firms should not attempt to build trust and construct 
formal contracts simultaneously, since both strategies are costly in terms of time and 
effort (Wuyts and Geykens 2005), and that one of two strategies serving the same goal 
of reducing opportunistic behavior may prove to be redundant (Dyer & Singh 1998). 
Thus, when there are high levels of trust between buyers and suppliers, it is unnecessary 
to specify or monitor contractual clauses (Dyer & Singh 1998) and it is possible to 
reduce transaction costs by “replacing contracts with handshakes” (Adler 2001). It has 
also been argued that exchange partners exhibit “bilateral expectations of willingness to 
make adaptations” (Heide & John 1992) to their contractual obligations in response to 
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changes in their operational environments, rather than strictly adhering to the original 
terms.  
Some researchers have further suggested that contracts and trust are not only redundant 
but in fact counteract their respective effects. Trying to reduce opportunistic behavior 
by drafting unduly detailed contracts containing coercive terms, clauses and sanctions, 
may be interpreted as a signal of distrust (Jap & Ganesan 2000). That distrust may, in 
turn, breed more distrust, causing the relationship between the controlling and 
controlled parties to degenerate into “pathological spiraling relationships” (Ghoshal & 
Moran 1996). Paradoxically, high levels of trust and cooperation between buyers and 
suppliers can actually undermine the effectiveness of explicit contracts, because of 
reluctance to obey severely enforced contractual details (Antia & Frazier 2001).  
The alternative complementary analysis of the relationship was proposed by Ring & 
Van de Ven (1994), Cannon et al. (2000), Poppo & Zenger (2002), Luo (2002), Reuer 
& Ariño (2007), Liu et al. (2009), and Carey et al. (2011). Given that contracts specify a 
long-term commitment to buyer-supplier KS, reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior 
and promote expectations that the other party will behave cooperatively, they contribute 
to the development of trust. However, in a reverse complementary relation, trust 
facilitates the refinement of contracts (Poppo and Zenger 2002). It has also been found 
that the co-existence of trust and contracts has a complementary effect: the higher the 
levels of trust and previous collaboration, the easier it is to adapt the contract to 
unforeseen changes of circumstance and complete it with new clauses and conditions, 
thereby nurturing continuing cooperation (Luo 2002). When both contracts and trust are 
present, ‘relationship performance’ improves more significantly and opportunism is 
more effectively restrained than when only one of the variables is present (Liu 2009). 
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that contractual agreements help ensure the 
continuity of the exchange when buyers and suppliers share ‘relational norms’ by virtue 
of clarifying the obligations and expectations of the parties (Cannon et al. 2000). Lastly, 
it has been found that enforcement of contract terms helps to ease buyers’ transition into 
exchanges with new sellers, thereby reducing the hazards, particularly in situations of 
high uncertainty about finding optimal partners (Lazzarini et al. 2008)  
Contradictory empirical studies that support opposing explanations of the mutual effect 
of contracts and trust are largely explained by the fact that the two factors play different 
roles and are not equally effective in regulating business relationships in all the 
 11
industries and regions in which research was conducted. For example, Yang et al. 
(2011) and Wang et al. (2011) warn that they could not generalize the results of their 
study which supported the substitution view, given that said results were influenced by 
Chinese culture and China’s rather ineffective legal system. We assume that the 
economic, cultural, political, legal, and business contexts in which buyers and suppliers 
are embedded, and that these influence the effectiveness of trust and contracts as 
governance mechanisms. Thus, we argue that research to test for complementarity or 
substitution should focus on key industry sectors in a variety of countries and regions in 
order to form a basis for the future generalization of findings. 
To sum up, there seem to be different but equally logical arguments for interpreting the 
contradictions that have been found with regard to the mutual effects of contracts and 
trust, namely the complexity of contractual provisions and factors related to regionality 
and industry sectors. In this sense, the characteristics of the machine tool industry, on 
which we base the empirical study, its focus on stable buyer-seller relationships, and its 
geographical location in Europe, lead us to formulate our hypothesis on positive 
relation:    
H4. The use of contracts is significantly related to a higher level of trust. 
 
Figure 1 shows the research hypotheses schematically in a general conceptual 
framework for the study.  
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
 
Trust 
Product-
innovation 
performance 
H2a + H2b + 
H3a + H3b + 
H1 + 
H4 + 
H2c + 
Knowledge 
sharing 
Contracts 
H3c + 
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As well as the formal research hypotheses, the figure depicts the indirect effects linked 
to trust and the use of contracts as mediators in the relationship between buyer-supplier 
KS and product innovation performance. It also shows trust as a mediator in the path 
from contracts to product innovation performance, which was not hypothesized.  
 
3. THE STUDY 
3.1 Sample selection 
The data for this empirical study were gathered from a sample of European companies 
in Divisions 28.4 and 28.9 of the European Commission’s NACE Rev.2 Statistical 
Classification of Economic activities in the European Community, which are 
respectively ‘Manufacture of metal forming machinery and machine tools’ and  
‘Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery’ (Eurostat 2008). Telephone 
interviews were conducted with 202 managers in the sales, production, and management 
departments between May and July 2010 by a specially commissioned professional 
interviewing organization. These represent the successfully completed interviews from a 
number of 632 initially contacted firms. The firms comprising the sampling frame were 
9,112 companies. These were selected from the NACE lists by reference to the 
AMADEUS searchable database of company information and business intelligence 
relating to 14 million companies in 43 European countries including the Russian 
Federation (Bureau van Dijk 2014). A sampling quota was constructed on the basis of 
the relative shares of the total machine tool industry in the European Union member 
states plus Switzerland. 
From a sampling frame of 9,112 companies, a quota sampling process dividing the 
population of firms in terms of country of origin, and size was followed. Proportions 
from countries were: 37% from Germany, 19.7% from Italy, 8.2% from Spain, 6.9% 
from France, 7.6% from Switzerland, and 20.7% from the rest of countries. In terms of 
size, an equal proportion distribution was formed dividing companies in two groups: 
those of less than 100 employees, and those having more than this number. 
Average response rate from these telephone interviews in all the considered sub-groups 
was of approximately 32% until completion of the required sample of 202 complete 
valid interviews. The questionnaire was administered in English. 
The following table shows some of the basic descriptive values as obtained from the 
final sample:  
 13
Table 1. Used sample 
Variable   
Size of firm 
< 100 workers 
Selling firms 
45 
Buying firms 
50 
≥ 100 workers 52 55 
Relationship with 
buyer/seller 
 
Since 2008 
Since 2006-2007 
Since 2003-2005 
Since 2000-2002 
Since before 2000 
 5.0% 
 4.5% 
 11.3% 
 17.3% 
 61.9% 
Industries involved Industrial equipment  
Motor and motor parts  
Dies and moulds 
Food 
Textile  
Aero-space 
Wood 
Plastic materials 
Other 
 35.3% 
 11.3% 
 6.0% 
 5.3% 
 4.0% 
 2.3% 
 2.3% 
 1.3% 
 32.2% 
 
 In order to attain the highest possible level of robustness in the model and to minimize 
variance in measurements and results between the supply and the distribution channels, 
the total sample was divided into two subsamples, formed by firms buying (n = 105) 
and selling (n = 97) the specified machinery and machine tools. The division of the 
sample into buyers and sellers in order to test the proposed measurement and causal 
models implies its inclusion as a control variable. Due to the reduced sizes of said sub-
samples, no other control variables were taken for the analysis. However, we used 
company unit data on their nationality and size, in order not to depart significantly from 
population quotas.  
The criterion for selection of respondents was that they should be: in the case of the 
buying firms, the most senior production executive or, failing that, a plant manager or 
the CEO. In the case of the selling firms, they were preferably a sales manager or else 
the CEO. Respondents were asked to focus on a particular relationship with 
counterparts in a selling or buying firm, preferably during a recent buying or selling 
operation. The relationship was to have involved the sale and purchase of machinery, 
machine parts or complete installations which featured an innovation of some sort, 
which had originated, at least in part, from the relationship with that particular buyer 
or supplier.  
 
3.2 Questionnaire design 
To collect data measuring product innovation performance, we constructed a scale 
based on those in studies by Gemünden, Ritter & Heydebreck (1996), Ritter & 
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Gemünden (2004) and Salomo, Weise & Gemünden (2007). The scale used for 
responses relating to buyer-supplier KS routines drew on the original ideas of Dyer & 
Singh (1998) and Dyer & Nobeoka (2000), two seminal works which did not 
themselves propose measurement scales. On this basis, with the collaboration of 26 
teaching staff and doctoral students at a Spanish and German university, an initial list of 
items was drawn up. It was in turn subjected to the judgments of two other research 
teams from our own department who had contributed to the study, allowing us finally to 
refine the list to six and five items for the cases of product-innovation performance and 
buyer-supplier KS routines, respectively.  
Following the testing of the measurement model, additionally to the restriction of 
eliminating poor values in terms of reliability and validity, we had to reduce the number 
or admitted items per construct to only those that also guarantee the condition of 
measurement invariance across the two studied sub-samples (explained below). Thus, 
the items shown in Table 2 are those that finally complied with this condition: 2 from 
the initial number of 5, for product innovation performance, 3 from 5 in knowledge-
sharing, all (i.e. 3) of the considered from contracts, and 2 from 3 initially considered 
for trust. These scales were comprised of two and three items, respectively (shown in 
Table 2).  
With respect to the trust factor, there are relevant works showing how it has to be 
measured (see for example: Seppanen et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2010; Whipple et al., 
2013). In our case, respondents answered on the ‘beliefs in interpersonal 
trustworthiness’ scale developed by Jap (1999). Although the original scale from this 
author contained five items, the invariance tests for both subsamples (explained below) 
obliged us to reduce this scales to two (see in Table 2).  
For measurement of the contracts construct, the scale was derived from the ‘legal 
bonds’ factor in the work of Cannon et al. (2000), with a total of three items (see Table 
2). 
We used 7 point Likert scales. The measurement scales were devised for interpretation 
depending on whether the respondent’s firm was the buyer or seller in a machine tool 
sales transaction. Individual evaluations furthermore focused either on the sales or 
purchasing functions in a respondent’s own firm or on the buyer-seller relationship as a 
whole.  
 
3.3 Testing the measurement model 
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Table 2 presents translations of respondents’ verbatim comments relating to the ten 
measurement items finally included in the measurement model, with the corresponding 
reliability in each case. Factor loadings, Cronbach’s Alpha, average variance extracted 
(AVE) and construct reliability measures demonstrate average-to-good values, 
depending on the factor measured. In the case of the buyer-supplier KS factor, the test 
measures did not reach the minimum recommended values of 0.70 for Cronbach’s alpha 
(Nunnally & Bernstein 1994) or 0.50 for the AVE (Fornell & Larcker 1981). However, 
composite reliability measures between 0.6 and 0.7 may be considered acceptable if the 
estimates of the model validity are good (Malhotra et al. 2012, p.876). In particular, the 
chi-square test result (Anderson & Gerbing 1988) confirmed discriminant validity 
among the factors, as general convergence results obtained from setting the highest 
correlation to 1 yielded an adjusted result inferior to that from the obtained correlation.  
Table 2. Reliability testing 
  Standardized 
loadings 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
AVE Composite 
reliability 
Innovation performance 
INP1: Thanks to the incorporated 
innovations, the product sold to this customer 
(or purchased from this supplier) allows us to 
attain exceptional quality or competitive 
advantage in the sector. 
INP2: Thanks to incorporated innovations, 
the machine sold (or purchased) provides us 
with a significant competitive edge. 
 
0.723 
 
 
 
 
0.852 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.763 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.624 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.768 
Knowledge-sharing routines 
KSR1: Our technical experts provided our 
customer (or supplier) with a lot of 
information and specific knowledge, which 
was a very useful input to the development of 
our product. 
KSR2: We believe that good innovative ideas 
have derived from the suggestions or demands 
that we make or have made on our customer 
(or supplier). 
KSR3: We have or have had frequent 
discussions with this customer (or supplier) at 
which we put forward worthwhile information 
for improvement of the machine we sold (or 
purchased). 
 
0.632 
 
 
 
 
0.579 
 
 
 
0.673 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.663 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.396 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.662 
Contracts 
CO1: We have or have had written 
agreements detailing the obligations of both 
parties. 
CO2: We have detailed written agreements 
with this customer (or supplier). 
CO3: We have or have had a detailed contract 
with this customer (or supplier), specifying 
the innovation that the product is or was to 
feature. 
 
0.963 
 
 
0.960 
 
0.757 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.807 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.854 
Trust     
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TR1: Both the customer (or supplier) and our 
company try to help each other mutually. 
TR2: Both companies trust each other. 
 
0.643 
0.766 
 
 
0.677 
 
 
0.500 
 
 
0.665 
Notes: 
Base: 202 responses 
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD MEASURES: χ2 = 46.097 ; p = 0.02295; 29 d.f. ; Standardized Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.056; 90% Confidence Interval of RMSEA  (0.021, 0.086);Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = 0.043 ; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.981 
ROBUST MEASURES: Satorra Bentler χ2 = 37.099; p = 0.14372; 29 d.f.;Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index = 
0.955;Bentler-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index = 0.984; CFI = 0.989; Bollen’s Incremental Fit Index = 0.990; 
RMSEA = 0.039; 90% Confidence Interval of RMSEA  (0.000, 0.072). 
 
The obtained means, standard deviations and paired Pearson correlations of the used 
items are represented in table 3. We obtained a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
from these items grouped into the above defined constructs of our model using 
Structural Equation Modelling (Bollen 1989).  
 
Table 3. Means, standard deviations and Pearson correlations of the model items 
for the whole sample 
Item Mean 
Std. 
Dev. (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1)INP1 5.72 1.036 
(2)INP2 5.61 1.028 0.616**         
(3) KS1 5.58 1.259 0.252** 0.294**        
(4) KS2 5.39 1.055 0.322** 0.272** 0.408**       
(5) KS3 5.27 1.347 0.324** 0.321** 0.402** 0.387**      
(6) CO1 5.06 1.889 0.142* 0.279** 0.134 0.094 0.236**     
(7) CO2 4.97 1.851 0.206** 0.290** 0.202** 0.125 0.314** 0.924**    
(8)MCO3 4.79 1.892 0.173* 0.250** 0.143* 0.091 0.254** 0.720** 0.725**   
(9) TR1 5.63 1.192 0.290** 0.334** 0.237** 0.130 0.204** 0.463** 0.427** 0.368**  
(10) TR2 5.86 0.957 0.365** 0.498** 0.252** 0.240** 0.370** 0.391** 0.433** 0.349** 0.524** 
* p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01 
  
For its part, Table 4 shows that the confidence interval for each of the bivariate factor 
correlations did not include the value of 1 in any confidence interval. Finally, the square 
roots of all AVE values obtained are higher than any correlation in their corresponding 
row or column. Convergent and discriminant validity among the five factors is therefore 
demonstrated by the tests applied.   
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Table 4. Test of discriminant validity 
 
Innovation 
performance 
Knowledge-
sharing routines Contracts Trust 
Innovation performance  0.790 0.622*** 0.312*** 0.690*** 
Knowledge-sharing routines  (0.446; 0.818) 0.629 0.383*** 0.624*** 
Contracts  (0.145; 0.479) (0.193;0.573) 0.899 0.620*** 
Trust  (0.535; 0.845) (0.434;0.814) (0.491;0.749) 0.707 
Notes:  
*p , 0.05; **p , 0.01; ***p , 0.001. Diagonal values represent the square root of the AVE. Those above 
the diagonal are factor correlations; those below are the confidence intervals of factor correlations. 
 
According to the literature, in a cross-section study, common method variance can be 
lowered by means of a series of ex ante practical decisions, and ex post tests (Chang, 
Van Witteloostuijn, & Eden 2010, Nimon & Astakhova 2015, Simmering, Fuller, 
Richardson, Ocal, & Atinc 2015). The ex ante decisions involved the introduction of 
dependent and independent variables in different sections of the questionnaire, a 
guarantee of anonymity of interviewees, and an accurate selection of respondents 
(MacKenzie & Posdsakoff, 2012). These measures described above were put in practice 
in the enclosed empirical study. 
With respect to ex post measurement common method variance can be ascertained by 
means of a number of procedures (Podsakoff and Organ 1986, Lindell and Whitney 
2001, Podsakoff et al. 2003). A first test is the Harman’s one factor procedure using 
Principal Component Analysis (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). From this test, the obtained 
non-rotated single factor solution rendered a proportion of total variance equal to 
40.46%, less than the limit threshold of 50%. 
However, nowadays this test is not regarded in the literature as one giving sufficient 
accuracy of method variance. Thus, following Lindell and Whitney’s (2001) increased 
marker variable factor, we employed a seemingly unrelated construct containing three 
reflective items and named dependence. This construct had been considered in the 
empirical study but finally was not included in our model. The results obtained show 
that the added factor did not give a significant increased effect in the general adjusted 
valued Chi-square values (∆χ2 = 23.702 for ∆df=26, from the accepted CFA model). 
Thus, from these results we can conclude that the measurement scale do not reach a 
critical level of common method variance.  
To assess the extent to which the outcome of our study was a robust and generally 
applicable model, we applied it both to a buyer firm’s view of its relationships with 
suppliers and to a supplier firm’s view of its relationships with buyer firms. If a 
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measurement scale is to be used in different subsets of a sampling universe, as in this 
case, the observed variables or scales must be invariant across the whole research 
population (Mellenbergh 1989; Meredith 1993) at one of three levels labeled by 
Meredith as ‘weak’, ‘strong’ or ‘strict’.  
Measurement invariance is held to be weak if equality of factor loadings is found for at 
least two items per factor (Byrne 1989; Byrne 2006, p.241-246; Hair et al. 2006, p.823; 
Muthén & Christofferson 1981). Table 5 shows that, in the case of the scales used in our 
study, the incremental chi-square values obtained demonstrate the non-significance of 
the value for the general adjustment, due to the restriction of equal factor loadings 
between seller and buyer firms. Thus, the measurement invariance between the buyer 
and seller subsamples was found to be weak. 
Table 5. Tests of measurement invariance 
 χ
2
 
†
 χ
2
S-B 
††
 df ∆ χ2 ∆df p ∆ χ2S-B p S-B RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
SRMR CFI TLI 
(NNFI) 
Single groups: 
Buyers (n=95) 
(p) 
Sellers (n=97) 
(p) 
 
45.937 
(0.024) 
50.944 
(0.007) 
 
33.265 
(0.267) 
37.281 
(0.139) 
 
29 
 
29 
     0.081 
(0.030, 0.123) 
 
0.093 
(0.048, 0.134) 
 
0.067 
 
0.059 
 
0.967 
 
0.943 
 
0.948 
 
0.912 
Measurement 
invariance: 
Equal form 
(p) 
Equal factor 
loadings 
(p) 
 
 
96.882 
(0.001) 
99.896 
(0.003) 
 
 
70.529 
(0.125) 
74.105 
(0.182) 
 
 
58 
 
64 
 
 
 
 
3.014 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
0.807 
 
 
 
 
2.739 
 
 
 
 
0.841 
 
 
0.087 
(0.055, 0.116) 
 
0.080 
(0.047, 0.108) 
 
0.063 
 
0.067 
 
0.957 
 
0.960 
 
0.933 
 
0.944 
 
Notes: 
Base: 202 responses 
90%CI = 90% confidence interval for RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation); SRMR = standardized root mean square 
residual; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI (NNFI) = Tucker-Lewis Index (Bentler-Bonett non-normed fit index) 
† Maximum-Likelihood adjusted chi-square values 
††Satorra-Bentler adjusted chi-square values 
 
 
3.4 Results 
Structural equation modeling was used to test the eight hypotheses comprising the 
proposed model of the impact of trust and contracts on buyer-supplier knowledge- 
sharing and their effect on innovation, as set out schematically in Figure 1. The results 
are presented in Table 6.  
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Hypotheses H1 to H2b, H3a, H3b and H4 were assessed by means of the decomposition of 
total effects into the direct effects of their respective antecedent over the consequent. 
The rows of the table relating to H2c and H3c, and those captioned (1), (2) and (3) 
contain all the possible indirect effects existing among the factors in the model. 
However, an important limitation of this procedure is the possibility of non-linear 
effects among factors (Wang et al. 2011), such as the case of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the use of contracts and innovation performance, in which both too 
few or too detailed contractual terms correspond to low levels of innovation 
performance. The same could apply to the level of use of contracts with respect to 
buyer-supplier KS. We did in fact examine the effect of any possible quadratic effect of 
factor contracts, or a non-linear relation of these with buyer-supplier KS or with trust, 
finding no significant effects. These results are not shown here for the sake of brevity. 
 
Table 6.  Regression Coefficients, t values and Model Summary Information 
 
 Total Total sample‡ Multi-sample model ‡• 
   Buyers Sellers   
 Direct and 
indirect effects 
Std 
Coeff 
t Std 
Coeff 
t Std 
Coeff 
t ∆ 
Std 
Coeff 
Two-tailed 
t 
H1 KS→IP 0.311 2.379** 0.487 3.493*** 0.460 3.493*** 0.027 0.983 
H2a KS→T 0.585 4.397*** 0.557 3.837*** 0.393 3.411*** 0.055 0.965 
H2b T→PIP 0.616 3.149*** 0.510 2.045* 0.345 2.149* 0.165 0.896 
H2c KS→T→ PIP 0.266 2.546** 0.229 1.762 0.136 2.546* 0.093 0.941 
H3a KS→C 0.318 2.996** 0.182 1.907 0.212 1.907 -0.030 0.981 
H3b C→ PIP -0.170 -1.591 -0.041 -0.217 -0.048 -0.358 0.007 0.996 
H3c KS→C→PIP -0.054 -1.348 -0.008 -0.196 -0.010 -0.318 0.003 0.998 
H4 C→T 0.482 4.558*** 0.595 4.453*** 0.479 3.411*** 0.116 0.926 
(1) C→T→ PIP 0.297 3.031 0.304 1.914 0.165 1.805 0.139 0.912 
(2) KS→ C→T 0.154 2.335* 0.108 1.680 0.101 1.531 0.007 0.996 
(3) KS→T→ C→ PIP 0.094 2.063
*
 0.055 1.330 0.035 1.317 0.020 0.987 
Notes: 
KS = knowledge sharing; PIP = product-innovation performance; T = trust; C = 
contracts  
‡   χ2S-B (df=29) = 37.099 (p = 0.144); RMSEA= 0.039 (0.000, 0.072); CFI = 0.989; 
TLI = 0.984    
‡• χ2S-B (df=67) = 75.885 (p = 0.214); RMSEA= 0.039 (0.000, 0.076); CFI = 0.990; 
TLI = 0.987    
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Overall, the regression coefficients relating to the hypotheses do not vary from the total 
sample to the buyer and seller subsamples. The details of the results show, first of all, 
that there is a positive and significant direct relationship between buyer-supplier KS and 
product innovation performance, supporting hypothesis H1. A significant positive 
relationship was also found between buyer-supplier KS and mutual trust and between 
trust and product innovation performance, meaning that hypotheses H2a and H2b are 
supported.   
The proposed model also shows the full extent of the mediation effects of both trust and 
the use of contracts in the relationship between buyer-supplier KS and product 
innovation performance. An interesting interpretation of these relationships emerges 
from analysis of the mediating role of trust, formalized in hypothesis H2c. In the cases of 
the total sample and the selling companies subsample in particular, this mediation effect 
is significantly positive, meaning that inter-firm trust accounts at least partially for the 
positive relationship existing between buyer-supplier KS and product innovation 
performance. This positive sign in the mediation effect was also found in the buying 
firms subsample, but only at a weak significance level of 8.1%. 
Contrary to the propositions in hypothesis H3b, the use of contracts does not seem to 
have any significant effect, positive or negative, on product innovation performance in 
any of the subsamples. They are therefore rejected. On the contrary, a more intensive 
level of buyer-supplier KS seems to be positively related to greater use of contracts, as 
posited in hypothesis H3a. This result holds only in the case of the whole sample, though 
it is almost statistically significant at 5% in the cases of the buyer and seller subsamples.  
A more complete view of this relationship is to be found in the mediation role of 
contracts between buyer-supplier KS and trust, as shown in the row of Table 5 labeled 
(2). Again, the regression slope of this indirect effect is significantly positive in the case 
of the total sample, meaning that a significant portion of the positive effect of buyer-
supplier KS on trust is attributable to the use of contracts. However, their mediating role 
in the relation between buyer-supplier KS and product innovation performance is 
negative, albeit non-significant. It seems that the use of contracts has a dual role, 
positively related to trust and buyer-supplier KS on the one hand, but with a non-
significant negative effect on product innovation performance on the other. 
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Lastly, these results show a significant positive relation between trust and contracts. 
This supports hypothesis H4, sustaining a complementary relation between these two 
measures of guarantee and control.  
 
4. DISCUSSION 
The results of our study support the view of the majority of works in the relevant 
literature, stressing the importance of knowledge-sharing between buyers and their 
suppliers, and the relevant role of trust in order to achieve this.   
However, the role of contracts is more controversial. Contracts seem necessary for 
buyer-supplier KS to take place, such as Jap and Ganesan 2000, Sivadas and Dwyer 
2000, Noordhoff et al. 2011, and Wang et al. 2011 advocated. However, contracts alone 
do not act as an antecedent factor contributing directly to innovation performance. The 
proposal from Wang (2011) that the relation between the formalization of norms in a 
contract and innovation performance is not linear, and forms an inverted ‘U’ shaped 
effect may explain this apparent lack of relation.   
Secondly, the findings of our study do not seem to support the notion of contracts and 
trust as alternative governance mechanisms in the buyer-supplier transaction. On the 
contrary, they are consistent with the literature linking those phenomena in a 
complementary relationship (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Cannon et al. 2000; Poppo 
and Zenger 2002; Luo 2002; Reuer and Ariño 2007; Liu et al. 2009; Carey et al. 2011). 
Each performs a different role within the general objective of achieving the required 
level of relationship governance. On the basis of our results, it is plausible, on the one 
hand, to assert that contracts are a necessary ingredient for the development of trust. On 
the other hand, it is only trust that exerts a positive influence on product innovation 
performance. Specification of the mutual obligations in the relationship, under a 
contract, favors mutual trust and relates positively to the exchange of knowledge 
between the parties, although, as we have previously indicated, they hold no direct 
influence on innovation performance. For said cause-and-effect relationship to occur, 
mutual trust must be bolstered in the relationship.   
Furthermore, it must be considered that the high level of correlation between trust and 
contracts could have led us to posit, instead of a series of mediation effects, an 
interaction effect (Baron & Kenny 1986; Hayes 2013): specifically, a positive 
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interaction between trust and contracts acting in combination on product innovation 
performance. To be clear, that possibility was empirically checked and discarded, 
although those results are not presented here, for the sake of brevity. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study tests, from a double set of machine tools buyers and suppliers, the mediating 
role of contracts and trust on the generation of product innovation as a consequence of 
their efforts to share knowledge. 
Results back the relevant role of buyer-supplier KS on innovation performance, and 
show the mutual interaction between trust and contracts and their individual and 
combined mediation effects on the causal linkage between buyer-supplier KS and 
product innovation performance. These results confirm the positive relationship 
between trust and the use of contracts with respect to buyer-supplier KS, and that there 
is a significant and positive interaction between these two variables. It is also evidenced 
that trust within the relationship mediates the linear effect from buyer-supplier KS to 
product innovation performance partially although in a significantly positive manner. 
However, contracts alone do not act as a direct stimulus for product innovation.  
These results bring important implications for management: buyers and suppliers who 
seek to improve their innovative capacity based on their relationship must act to share 
knowledge valid for this purpose, improving the technical resources that facilitate the 
exchange, its frequency, content and quality. In order that this can take place, the 
mediation effects from the use of contracts and trust seem to be relevant: specification 
of contracts stating the agreements, expectations and obligations of the parties 
guarantees the initial point of exchanges. This evolving relationship helps to generate 
trust between the parties, as long as their mutual behavior reveals to be based on good 
faith and not opportunism. This increased confidence prompts sharing more valuable 
knowledge and continuously improves innovative capacity. Therefore, entering into 
contracts with a degree of formalization that increases confidence (without detracting 
from it) and does not defraud the other party’s expectations through opportunistic 
behavior seem to be two highly recommended actions in the buyer -supplier relationship 
oriented to the improvement of innovative capacity. 
 23
Lastly, we highlight that these implications are valid for both sides within the buyer-
supplier dyadic relationship. This was obtained from equivalence in the cases of both 
buying firms with respect to their sellers and selling firms with respect to their buyers. 
Previous research has been conducted from the perspective of either one or the other. To 
the best of our knowledge, no other empirical study reported in the literature has 
confirmed the hypothesized relationships among the factors investigated here by 
collecting data simultaneously from subsamples of selling and buying firms.  
 
6. LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
A methodological limitation of our study, affecting the scope for generalization, is that 
the sample from which the data for analysis were collected was drawn from a frame 
containing only companies in the machine tool and related industries. Said sector is 
particularly characterized by very long-standing buyer-supplier relationships. They 
often span the working life of the product or installation between companies consuming 
or producing complex custom-built products for which servicing becomes vital. The 
context is distinctive in its constituent web of relationships, in the form of ‘weak ties’ 
(Granovetter 1973) downwards in the value-adding process, upwards along the supply 
chain, and horizontally with other companies in the same location (Marshall 1890). In 
this context, not only trust but also other elements contributing to the governance of the 
relationship, such as reputation or word-of-mouth, become very relevant. Future studies 
should incorporate these effects, comparatively, among different industries.  
Another limitation was encountered during the process of validating the measurement 
scales. The condition of weak measurement invariance across the two analyzed 
populations obliged us to discard a number of items (Mellenbergh 1989; Meredith 
1993), resulting in a minimum of two in the case of the innovation-performance and 
trust constructs (see Table 1).   
Future studies may also include more fine-grained measures of, for example, knowledge 
exchange, a phenomenon hard to capture. Multiple measures used in some studies that 
were not considered by us before conducting this survey (Cummings and Teng, 2003, 
61-63; Du et al., 2007, 41; Li, 2012, 5406-07) can be very helpful for this purpose. 
Likewise, while our study has been focused on buyer-supplier relations in the machine 
tool industry, we think that it could be interesting to also measure the mediation effects 
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of trust on the relationship between knowledge exchange and product innovation 
between NPD teams within firms. In recent years, many machine tool firms have grown 
internationally via mergers and acquisitions of foreign firms, and we think that it could 
be interesting to research what kind of barriers those firms found for the knowledge 
transfer between NPD teams of the parent companies and their affiliates and 
subsidiaries. For this purpose, the literature review conducted by Frank et al. (2014) 
could be highly valuable as a starting point.   
Finally, it must be recognized that the interrelations among the factors analyzed here, 
and others that were discarded, will usually evolve dynamically over a number of years. 
A cross-sectional study such as ours can only show some of these relationships in a very 
limited and static manner. The direction of causality in some of those in the model is an 
important aspect that we think cannot be fully ascertained in a cross-sectional empirical 
analysis of what are, in fact, long-standing buyer-seller relations. In our study in 
particular, we assumed that it would become difficult to distinguish the direction of 
causality between buyer-supplier KS and the use of contracts after a long period of time, 
or between contracts and trust. We nevertheless did obtain significant slopes, 
exclusively in the form of recursive effects. A longitudinal empirical analysis could 
shed more light on the true nature of the interrelationships among these factors. 
 
 25
REFERENCES 
Adler, P. S. 2001. Market, hierarchy, and trust: the knowledge economy and the future 
of capitalism. Organization Science, 12(2), 215-234. 
Anderson, J.C., Narus, J.A., 1990. A model of distributor firm and manufacturer firm 
working partnerships, Journal of Marketing, 54(1), 42-58. 
Anderson, J.C., Gerbing, D.W. 1988. Structural equation modeling in practice: a review 
and recommended two-step approach. Psychological Bulletin, 103(3), 411-423. 
Antia, K. D., Frazier, G. L. 2001. The severity of contract enforcement in interfirm 
channel relationships. Journal of Marketing, 65(4), 67-81. 
Ballantyne, D. 2004. Dialogue and its role in the development of relationship specific 
knowledge. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 19(2), 114-123. 
Baron, R., Kenny, D.A. 1986. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173-1182. 
Bessant, J., 2004. Supply chain learning, In: New, S., Westbrook, R., (Eds.). 
Understanding supply chains: concepts, critiques and futures. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 165-190. 
Bidault, F., Castello, A. 2009. Trust and creativity. Understanding the role of trust in 
creativity-oriented joint developments. R&D Management, 39(3), 260-270. 
Blomqvist, K., Hurmelinna, P., Seppänen, R. (2005). Playing the collaboration game 
right − balancing trust and contracting. Technovation, 25(5), 497-504. 
Bollen, K. A.1989. Structural Equations with Latent Variables. New York: Wiley   
Bonner, J. M., Walker, O. C., 2004. Selecting influential business-to-business customers 
in new product development: relational embeddedness and knowledge 
heterogeneity considerations. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 21(3), 
155-69. 
Bruin, J. (2006). Newtest: Command to compute new test. UCLA: Statistical Consulting 
Group.  http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/ado/analysis/ 
 26
Bureau van Dijk, 2014. AMADEUS: A database of comparable financial information 
for public and private companies across Europe, Amsterdam, Netherlands: 
Bureau van Dijk. 
Byrne, B., 1989. A primer of LISREL: basic applications and programming for 
confirmatory factor analytic models. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Byrne, B., 2006. Structural equation Modeling with EQS: basic concepts, cpplications, 
and programming, 2nd ed. Mahwah, NJ: Psychology Press.   
Cannon, J. P., Achrol, R. S., Gundlach, G. T. 2000. Contracts, norms, and plural form 
governance. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 28(2), 180-194. 
Cao, Z., & Lumineau, F. (2015). Revisiting the interplay between contractual and 
relational governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation. Journal of 
Operations Management, 33-34, 15-42.  
Carey, S., Lawson, B., Krause, D. R. 2011. Social capital configuration, legal bonds and 
performance in buyer-supplier relationships. Journal of Operations Management, 
29(4), 277-288. 
Carlsson, B. (Ed.), 1995. Technological Systems and Economic Performance: the case 
of Factory Automation. Boston, MA, Kluwer Academic. 
Chang, S. J., Van Witteloostuijn, A., & Eden, L. (2010). From the editors: Common 
method variance in international business research. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 41, 178-184. 
Charterina, J., Landeta, J. 2010. The pool effect of dyad-basedcapabilities on seller 
firms’ innovativeness. European Journal of Innovation Management, 13(2), 172-
196. 
Charterina, J., Landeta, J. 2013. Effects of knowledge-sharing routines and dyad-based 
investments on company innovation and performance: An empirical study on 
Spanish manufacturing companies, 30(1), 20-39. 
Chen, J. (2006), “Development of Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises”, 
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 140-
147. 
Chen, L.C., 2009. Learning through informal local and global linkages: the case of 
Taiwan’s machine tool industry. Research Policy, 38(3), 527-535. 
 27
Cheung, M. W-L. 2007. Comparison of approaches to constructing confidence intervals 
for mediating effects using structural equation models. Structural Equation 
Modeling, 14(2), 227-246. 
Chuma, H., 2001. Sources of machine-tool industry leadership in the 1990s: Overlooked 
intrafirm factors. Discussion Paper no. 837. New Haven, CT, Yale University 
Economic Growth Center 
Cummings, J. L., Teng, B. S., 2003. Transferring R&D knowledge: the key factors 
affecting knowledge transfer success. Journal of Engineering and technology 
management, 20(1), 39-68. 
Du, R., Ai, S., Ren, Y., 2007. Relationship between knowledge sharing and 
performance: A survey in Xi’an, China. Expert systems with Applications, 32(1), 
38-46. 
Dyer, J.H. 1997. Effective interfirm collaboration: how firms minimize transaction costs 
and maximize transaction value. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 535-556. 
Dyer, J.H., Singh, H., 1998. The relational view: cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 
23(4), 660-679. 
Dyer, J.H., Nobeoka, K., 2000. Creating and managing a high-performance knowledge-
sharing network: the Toyota case. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3), 345-67. 
Eurostat, 2008. NACE Rev.2: Statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Community. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities. Fawcett, S.E., Fawcett, A.M., Watson, B.J., and Magnan, 
G.M. 2012. “Peeking Inside the Black Box: Toward an Understanding of Supply 
Chain Collaboration Dynamics.” Journal of Supply Chain Management 48(1):44–
72. 
Fornell, C.,Larcker, D.F. 1981. Evaluating structural equation models with 
unobservable variables and measurement error. Journal of Marketing Research, 
XVIII(1), 39-50. 
Frank, A. G., Ribeiro, J. L. D., & Echeveste, M. E. 2015. Factors influencing 
knowledge transfer between NPD teams: a taxonomic analysis based on a 
sociotechnical approach. R&D Management, 45(1), 1-22. 
 28
Gaskin, J. (2012). Common method bias (CMB), Gaskination's StatWiki. Retrieved Oct. 
16, 2014, from http://statwiki.kolobkreations.com 
Gemünden, H.G., Ritter, T., Heydebreck, P. 1996. Network configuration and 
innovation success: an empirical analysis in German high-tech industries. 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 13(5), 449-462. 
Ghoshal, S., Moran, P. 1996. Bad for practice: a critique of the transaction cost theory. 
Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 13-47. 
Gila, N., 2009. Developing cooperative project client-supplier relationships: how much 
to expect from relational contracts? California Management Review, Vol. 51, pp. 
144-69. 
Granovetter, M.S. 1973. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 
78(6), 1360-1380 
Grönroos, C., 1983. Strategic management and marketing in the service sector, 
Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science Institute. 
Gulati, R. 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for 
contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 85-112.  
Gulati, R., Sytch, M. 2007. Dependence asymmetry and joint dependence in 
interorganizational relationships: effects of embeddedness on exchange 
performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52, 32-69. 
Hair, J. F. Jr., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E.,Tatham, R. L. 2006. 
Multivariate Data Analysis, 6th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Hayes, A. 2013. Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process 
analysis: a regression-based approach. New York: Guilford Press. 
Heide, J., John, G. 1992. Do norms matter in marketing relationships? Journal of 
Marketing, 56(1), 32-44.  
Huang, H-C., Chang, C-W. 2008. Embedded ties and the acquisition of competitive 
advantage. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 9(1), 105-121. 
Jap, S.D. 1999. Pie-expansion efforts: collaboration processes in buyer-supplier 
relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 36(4), 461-475. 
 29
Jap, S. D., Ganesan, S., 2000. Control mechanisms and the relationship life cycle: 
implications for safeguarding specific investments and developing commitment. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2), 227-245.  
Jones, S., Fawcett, S. E., Fawcett, A. M., and Wallin, C. 2010. Benchmarking Trust 
Signals in Supply Chain Alliances: Moving toward a Robust Measure of Trust. 
Benchmarking: An International Journal, 17(5),705-727. 
Joshi, A. W., Stump, R. L. 1999. The contingent effect of specific asset investments on 
joint action in manufacturer-supplier relationships: an empirical test of the 
moderating role of reciprocal asset investments, uncertainty, and trust. Journal of 
the Academy of Marketing Science, 27(3), 291-305. 
Krishnan, R., Geysenks, I., Steenkamp, J.B. 2016. The effectiveness of contractual and 
trust-based governance in strategic alliances under behavioral and environmental 
uncertainty. Strategic Management Journal, 37, 2521–2542. doi:10.1002/smj.2469 
Krishnan, R., Martín, X., Noorderhaven, N.G. 2006. When does trust matter to alliance 
performance? Academy of Management Journal, 49(5), 894-917. 
Lane, P. J., Salk, J. E., Lyles, M. A. 2001. Absorptive capacity, learning, and 
performance in international joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal, 
22(12), 1139-1161. 
Lazzarini, S.G., Miller, G.J., Zenger, T.R. 2008. Dealing with the paradox of 
embeddedness: the role of contracts and trust in facilitating movement out of 
committed relationships. Organization Science, 19(5), 709-728. 
Li, C. Y., 2012. Knowledge stickiness in the buyer–supplier knowledge transfer 
process: The moderating effects of learning capability and social embeddedness. 
Expert Systems with Applications, 39(5), 5396-5408. 
Li, Y., Liu, X., Wang, L. Li, M., Guo, H., 2009. How entrepreneurial orientation 
moderates the effects of knowledge management on innovation. Systems 
Research and Behavioral Science, 26(6), 645-660. 
Lindell, M. K., & Whitney, D. J. 2001. Accounting for common method variance in 
cross-sectional research designs. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(1), 114-121. 
Lin, H.F. 2007. Knowledge sharing and firm innovation capability: an empirical study. 
International Journal of Manpower, 28(3-4), 315-332. 
 30
Lin, R-J,, Che, R-H.,Ting, C-Y., 2012. Turning knowledge management into innovation 
in the high-tech industry. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 112(1), 42-63. 
Lissoni, F., 2001. Knowledge codification and the geography of innovation: The case of 
Brescia mechanical cluster. Research Policy, 30(9), 1479-1500. 
Lissoni, F., Pagani M., 2003. How many networks in a local cluster? Textile machine 
production and innovation in Brescia. In: Forndahl, D., Brenner, T. (Eds.) 
Cooperation, networks and institutions in regional innovation systems. 
Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 220-246. 
Liu, Y., Luo, Y., Liu, T. 2009. Governing buyer-supplier relationships through 
transactional and relational mechanisms: evidence from China. Journal of 
Operations Management, 27(4), 294-309. 
Luo, Y. 2002. Contract, cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures. 
Strategic Management Journal, 23(10), 903-919. 
MacDuffie, J. P., Helper, S., 1997. Creating lean suppliers: diffusing lean production 
through the supply chain. California Management Review, 39 (4), 118–151. 
MacKenzie, S. B., & Podsakoff, P. M. (2012). Common method bias in marketing: 
causes, mechanisms, and procedural remedies. Journal of Retailing, 88, 542-555. 
Malhotra, N.K., Birks, D.F., Wills, P.  2012. Marketing Research. An Applied 
Approach. 4th ed. Harlow, UK: Pearson. 
Marshall, A. 1890. Principles of Economics. An Introductory Volume, 8th ed., London: 
Macmillan. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. 1995. An integrative model of 
organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709-734. 
Mellenbergh, G. J. 1989. Item bias and Item Response Theory. International Journal of 
Educational Research, 13(2), 127-143. 
Meredith, W. 1993. Measurement invariance, factor analysis and factorial invariance, 
Psychometrika, 58 (4), 525-543. 
Molina-Morales, F.X.; Martínez-Fernández, M.T., Torló, V.J. 2011. The dark side of 
trust: the benefits, costs and optimal levels of trust for innovation performance, 
Long Range Planning, 44(2), 118-133. 
 31
Moorman, C., Zaltman, G., Deshpandé, R. 1992. Relationships between providers and 
users of market research: the dynamics of trust. Journal of Marketing Research, 
29(3), 314-328. 
Morgan, R. M., Hunt, S. D. 1994. The commitment-trust theory of relationship 
marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58(3), 20-38. 
Muthén, B.,Christoffersson, A. 1981. Simultaneous factor analysis of dichotomous 
variables in several groups, Psychometrika, 46(4), 407-419. 
Nimon, K. F., & Astakhova, M. (2015). Improving the rigor of quantitative HRD 
research: Four recommendations in support of the general hierarchy of evidence. 
Human Resource Development Quarterly, 26, 231-247 
Noordevier, T.G., John, G., Nevin, J.R., 1990. “Performance outcomes of purchasing 
arrangements in industrial buyer-vendor relationships”, Journal of Marketing, 
54(4), 80-93. 
Noordhoff, C. S., Kyriakopoulos, K., Moorman, C., Pauwels, P., Dellaert, B. G. 2011. 
The bright side and dark side of embedded ties in business-to-business innovation. 
Journal of Marketing, 75(5), 34-52. 
Nunnally, J.C., Bernstein, I.H. 1994. Psychometric Theory (3rd ed.). New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Obal, M. 2013. Why do incumbents sometimes succeed? Investigating the role of 
interorganizational trust on the adoption of disruptive technology. Industrial 
Marketing Management, 42 (6), 900-908.  
Otero, B., 2010. Made in Euskadi: Innovando en el Sector de la Máquina-Herramienta 
de la CAPV (Made in the Basque Country: innovation in the Basque machine tool 
sector). Doctoral Dissertation, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), 
Spain. 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. 2003. Common 
method biases in behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and 
recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88 (5), 879-903. 
Podsakoff, P. M. & ORGAN, D.W. 1986. Self-Reports in Orgnaizational Research: 
Problems and Prospects. Journal of Management, 12(4), 531-544. 
 32
Poppo, L., Zenger, T. 2002. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as 
substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8), 707-725. 
Read, D., Jin, Y., and Fawcett, S.E. 2014. Trust in Value Co-Creation Strategies: 
Moving Toward a Conceptualization We Can Trust.  Journal of Business 
Logistics 35(1):97–98.  
Reuer, J. J., Ariño, A. 2007. Strategic alliance contracts: dimensions and determinants 
of contractual complexity. Strategic Management Journal, 28(3), 313-330. 
Ring P, Van de Ven, A. 1994. Developmental processes of cooperative 
interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19(1), 90-
118. 
Ritter, T., Gemünden, H.G. 2004. The impact of a company’s business strategy on its 
technological competence, network competence and innovation success. Journal 
of Business Research¸ 57(5), 548-556. 
Salomo, S., Weise, J. , Gemünden, H.G. 2007. NPD planning activities and innovation 
performance: the mediating role of process management and the moderating effect 
of product innovativeness. The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 24(4), 
285-302. 
Selnes, F., Sallis, J. 2003. Promoting relationship learning. Journal of Marketing, 67(3), 
80-95. 
Seppanen, R., Blomqvist, K., and Sundqvist, S. 2007. Measuring Inter-Organizational 
Trust--a Critical Review of the Empirical Research in 1990-2003. Industrial 
Marketing Management 36(2):249-265. 
Simmering, M. J., Fuller, C. M., Richardson, H. A., Ocal, Y., & Atinc, G. M. (2015). 
Marker variable choice, reporting, and interpretation in the detection of common 
method variance: A review and demonstration. Organizational Research 
Methods, 18, 473-511. 
Sivadas, E., Dwyer, F. R. 2000. An examination of organizational factors influencing 
new product success in internal and alliance-based processes. Journal of 
Marketing, 64(1), 31-49. 
Spender, J.C., Grant, R.M. 1996. Knowledge and the Firm: Overview. Strategic 
Management Journal 17:5–9 (Winter Special Issue). 
 33
Tsai, K-H., 2009. Collaborative networks and product innovation performance: toward 
a contingency perspective. Research Policy, 38(5), 765-778. 
Uzzi, B., 1997. Social structure and competition in inter-firm networks: the paradox of 
embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1), 35-67. 
Van Wijk, R., Jansen, J. J., Lyles, M. A., 2008. Inter‐and intra‐organizational 
knowledge transfer: a meta‐analytic review and assessment of its antecedents and 
consequences. Journal of Management Studies, 45(4), 830-853. 
Villena, V. H., Revilla, E., Choi, T. Y. 2011. The dark side of buyer-supplier 
relationships: a social capital perspective. Journal of Operations Management, 
29(6), 561-576. 
Wagner, S.M., 2006. A firm's responses to deficient suppliers and competitive 
advantage. Journal of Business Research, 59(6), 686-695. 
Wang, L., Yeung, J. H. Y., Zhang, M. 2011. The impact of trust and contract on 
innovation performance: the moderating role of environmental uncertainty. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 134(1), 114-122. 
Wengel, J., Shapira, P., 2004. Machine tools: the remaking of a traditional sectoral 
innovation system. In: Malerba, F., (Ed.). Sectoral systems of innovation: 
concepts, issues and analyses of six major sectors in Europe. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 243-286. 
Whipple, J. M., Griffis, S. E., and Daugherty, P. J. 2013. Conceptualizations of Trust: 
Can We Trust Them? Journal of Business Logistics 34(2):117–130.  
Williamson, O., 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Wuyts, S., Geyskens, I. 2005. The formation of buyer-supplier relationships: detailed 
contract drafting and close partner selection. Journal of Marketing, 64(4), 103-
117. 
Yang, Z., Zhou, C., Jiang, L. (2011). When do formal control and trust matter? A 
context-based analysis of the effects on marketing channel relationships in China. 
Industrial Marketing Management, 40(1), 86-96. 
 34
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., Perrone, V. (1998). Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of 
interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organization Science, 
9(2), 141-159. 
